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Abstract
The joint behaviour of US aggregate consumption and saving over the period 2007–
2009, and notably the pronouned U-shaped pattern of consumption together with 
the rise in saving, are difficult to reconcile with the view that financial markets are 
frictionless. We propose an alternative framework in which financial markets are 
incomplete and where households form a buffer stock of precautionary saving to self-
insure against the (time-varying) risk of falling into unemployment, with the 
consequence of considerably amplifying and propagating crises. Our model can be 
solved in closed form because the wealth heterogeneity generated by uninsured income 
shocks remains minimal. We end the article by arguing that fully incorporating 
uninsured and time-varying individual risks into macroeconomic analysis may 
drastically alter our understanding of the business cycle, macroeconomic policy, and 
the role of financial intermediaries. (JEL code: E21)
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1 Introduction
Among the pillars of mainstream macroeconomic analysis shaken by the
ongoing financial and economic crisis, perhaps that which has attracted
most attention is the assumption that financial markets work perfectly.
However, while few would now doubt that financial ‘frictions’ are import-
ant, it is still unclear which specific frictions have first-order implications
and how to model them in a both realistic and tractable manner. In this
article, we argue that a central such friction is that households face con-
siderably more uninsurable income risk (basically, unemployment risk)
than what is posited in the standard macroeconomic models. We then
offer an example of a tractable model in which the implications of this
friction can easily be analysed and use it to shed light on the recent evo-
lution of US aggregate consumption and saving.
The basic motivation for our approach is the observation, reported in
cross-sectional studies of household-level consumption and saving plans,
that the latter depend substantially on idiosyncratic labour income risk,
1 This article was prepared for the CESifo conference ‘‘What’s Wrong with Modern
Macroeconomics?’’, held in Munich on 6 and 7 November 2009.
and hence on the extent of the unemployment risk faced by individuals.2
As we illustrate and discuss in Section 2, one potential explanation for the
large and mean-reverting decline in US aggregate consumption that
occurred from the mid-2008 onwards, and the contemporaneous rise in
aggregate saving and the saving rate, is that individuals have cut spending
in order to (re-)constitute a ‘buffer stock’ of precautionary wealth. This
view is borne out by the rapid rise in the probability of involuntary layoffs
that occurred at the same time, since the risk of falling into unemployment
is the largest source of idiosyncratic income risk faced by most individuals.
Inasmuch as it is only imperfectly insured, it is likely to lead to a substan-
tial demand for ‘self-insurance’ via asset accumulation.
Although the effects of unemployment risk and the precautionary motive
for holding assets may have first-order effects on aggregate fluctuations,
they are particularly uneasy to model using current macroeconomic tools.
For one thing, much of the theoretical/quantitative analysis of the business
cycle is based on the complete-market, representative agent assumption. In
this setup, a transitory increase in unemployment amounts to a transitory
fall in aggregate labour income, and such changes have, by their very tran-
sitory nature, a limited impact on human wealth (i.e. the discounted value of
current and future labour income flows). Then, ‘permanent-income’ behav-
iour implies that the representative agent should change consumption only
by a small amount, with the cyclical variation in income being absorbed by
large and procyclical variations in aggregate savings.
Sections 3 and 4 spell out a simple model of the precautionary motive,
which is consistent with the observed U-shaped pattern of consumption
and the persistent rise in savings. In our model, the risk of falling into
unemployment is not socialized and entirely falls on every household’s
shoulders. Then, rising unemployment risk leads to a strengthening of
the precautionary motive for holding assets, and the increase in aggregate
savings that follows considerably amplifies the fall in current consump-
tion, relative to that implied by the complete markets model. Although
this amplifying mechanism differs from the textbook Keynesian explan-
ation based on price rigidity, it is reminiscent of the Keynesian argument
according to which the depth of recessions is due to large and persistent
shortages of aggregate demand.3
2 For example see Cochrane (1991), Carrol (1992), Guiso et al. (1996), and Gourinchas and
Parker (2002). Also see Jappelli (1990) for direct evidence that a share of US households are
liquidity-constrained, and hence cannot freely smooth out income fluctuations via borrowing.
3 In our model (and as in much of the incomplete-market literature), the uninsured labour
income risk that is associated with labour-market transitions is of purely transitory
nature. In Krebs (2007), in contract, unemployment risk generates permanent earning
losses (scars) for displaced workers. Introducing permanent income losses into our frame-
work could only strengthen the precautionary motive for holding wealth.
The complete insurance assumption is still widely used in macroeconom-
ics, even when labour market outcomes are involved. In particular, the
joint assumption of complete insurance markets together with labour
market (search) frictions were originally introduced by Merz (1995) and
Andolfatto (1996), and subsequently used by Den Haan et al. (2000) and
Walsh (2005), among many others. This class of models typically studies
the dynamics of unemployment assuming either that households are
risk-neutral, or that agents fully diversify unemployment risk within
large ‘families’. While these models yield important insights into the work-
ings of the labour market and the rate of frictional unemployment, they
have little to say about the effects of unemployment risk on the counter-
cyclicality of savings and the strong procyclicality of consumption that we
saw in the recent period.
An important class of models that dispenses with the complete markets
assumption is that of ‘heterogenous agents’ models, in which uninsured
idiosyncratic income risk coupled with borrowing constraints generate
large-dimensional heterogeneities in individual asset holdings (Bewley
1983; Aiyagari 1994; Krusell and Smith 1998). While these models have
proven extremely useful for sheding light on cross-sectional inequalities in
income and wealth, their applicability to the study of the business cycle
and macroeconomic policy has thus far remained limited. In these models
indeed, the whole history of employment statuses contribute to the deter-
mination of any agent’s wealth and infinitely many types of agents, each
of whom having their own optimal consumption and saving plans,
asymptotically co-exist in the economy. Because of the technical and com-
putational difficulties involved when handling large-dimensional cross-
sectional distributions, the first generation of heterogenous-agent models
focused on stationary environments in which idiosyncratic labour income
risk, while present, was assumed to be time-invariant. Variants of this
approach include the prominent infinite-horizon models of Huggett
(1993, 1997) and Aiyagari (1994), as well as overlapping generations
models as in Huggett (1996) and Heer (2001). Krusell and Smith (1997,
1998) were the first to introduce aggregate shocks and time-varying labour
income risk into this framework, but again computational limitations have
narrowed the scope of issues that can be investigated.4 In particular, the
time-varying nature of labour income risk is in general limited to two or
three states, and the continuous changes in unemployment risk that takes
place along the business cycles as well as its gradual impact on precau-
tionary saving cannot be studied explicitly.
4 Also see Heathcote (2005) on the effect of aggregate uncertainty about taxes in the
infinite-horizon framework, and Storesletten et al. (2007) for a stochastic overlapping-
generations asset-pricing model.
Our model differs from this latter approach by focusing on a class of
equilibria that endogenously generates a limited (in fact, minimal) degree
of cross-sectional heterogeneity, and in which the interactions between
idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks can straightforwardly be analysed.
The particularity of our model is that it can be solved with paper and
pencil and is thus liable to a variety of theoretical and quantitative ex-
plorations. Formally, this model belongs to broader class that we have
been developing and which relies on reducing the cross-sectional distri-
bution of heterogenous households from an infinite to a finite number of
types (see Algan et al. 2009, forthcoming; Challe and Ragot 2010; Challe
et al. 2010 for applications of this framework pertaining to asset pricing
and macroeconomic policy issues). More specifically, the class of equili-
bria that we focus on is based on two assumptions. The first is that
unemployed households always end up facing a binding borrowing con-
straint if they stay unemployed for a sufficiently large number of periods.
The second assumption is that the marginal utility of consumption is
constant above a certain threshold consumption level, which can be seen
as an extreme (but particularly simple) form of decreasing relative risk
aversion. While we focus of the simplest equilibrium having this joint
property here (i.e. one in which the constraint is binding from the very
first period of unemployment while marginal utility is constant for all
high-income agents), it is important to keep in mind that the framework
can handle larger (but, crucially, finite) cross-sectional wealth
distributions.
Section 5 discusses some alternative potential applications of our frame-
work and, more generally, how incorporating the large and time-varying
idiosyncratic income uncertainty that agents face may alter our under-
standing of the business cycle, macroeconomic policy, and the role of
financial intermediaries.
2 Consumption, saving, and unemployment risk over the
period 2007–2009
The present Section summarizes the evidence that motivates the theoret-
ical framework developed below. Figure 1a displays the joint behaviour of
personal consumption expenditures and gross domestic product (GDP)
in the US over the years 2007–2009. Figure 1b shows the behaviour of
aggregate saving and the saving rate over the same period (all four series
are from the National Income and Product Accounts). Finally, Figure 1c
is the Layoffs and Discharges Rate, extracted from the Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey of the Bureau of Labor Statistics, which we
take as a proxy for the unemployment risk faced by US households.
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Figure 1 Consumption, saving, GDP, and unemployment risk. Source: BEA/
NIPA (2007Q1-2009Q4) and BLS/JOLTS (2007M1-2009M12). Note: ‘Consump-
tion’ denotes personal consumption expenditures, and ‘Saving’ is defined as dis-
posable personal income minus personal consumption expenditures (and divided
by disposible personal income to obtain the ‘Saving Rate’). The ‘Layoffs and
Discharges Rate’ is that of the private sector.
The behaviour of aggregate consumption displays three striking fea-
tures. First, the drop in consumption that occurred from the mid-2008
onwards is large, both as a share of consumption before the shock and
proportionally to aggregate output. Second, it is U-shaped, with consump-
tion starting recovering about a year after its initial fall. Third, consump-
tion closely tracks GDP over this period. Figure 1b illustrates that the fall
in aggregate consumption has been associated with a substantial rise in
aggregate savings.
This pattern of consumption and saving appears puzzling from the point
of view of the frictionless, representative agent model. First, the strong
motive for intertemporal consumption smoothing predicted by that model
implies that aggregate consumption should react strongly to permanent
changes in aggregate (labour and capital) income but relatively little to
transitory income changes—i.e. the representative agent behaves as a
‘permanent income’ consumer. Hence, the baseline representative agent
model can be made consistent with the large fall in aggregate consumption
that took place in the second half of 2008 only to the extent that perman-
ent income has itself fallen sharply over this period. Second, and for
the very same reason, the U-shaped pattern of aggregate consumption
over the period can be reconciled with permanent income behaviour
only if perceived permanent income has itself been subject to very large
revisions. Only equally large news—first downwards in the mid-2008,
then upwards from the mid-2009 onwards—could have generated
such shifts.
The explanation for this pattern that we pursue here is that households
have engaged in strong precautionary saving behaviour. In short, the un-
employment risk faced by US households has risen considerably over the
period, and they have responded to this greater uncertainty by cutting
their consumption spending in order to (re-)constitute a buffer stock of
precautionary wealth. By definition, an increase in the precautionary
saving motive implies that, for a given level of income, agents substitute
current consumption for current saving, so the former may fall while the
latter rises. Moreover, the precautionary motive is stronger when labour
income risk increases, so this explanation is consistent with the observed
joint behaviour of aggregate consumption and the layoffs and discharges
rate—see Figure 1c.5 Third, since the precautionary saving motive is
5 We show the layoffs and discharges rate rather than the overall separations rate because
the former is arguably a more accurate indicator of the risk of unemployment perceived
by individuals. Since the beginning of 2007, the separation rate has decreased mildly, but
this resulted from the composition of layoffs and discharges (which have risen sharply, as
we document) and voluntary quits (which have fallen). See Shimer (2005) for historical
evidence on the separation and job-finding rates.
greater during recessions (because so is individual unemployment risk),
it amplifies the consumption fall that would prevail without it, possibly
to the point of rendering aggregate saving counter-cyclical. Finally,
the counter-cyclicality of individual unemployment risk and its impact
on precautionary saving imply that changes in aggregate income that
are purely transitory (and fully anticipated as such) may bring about an
equally cyclical response of consumption; this provides a natural explan-
ation for the U-shaped pattern of consumption over the period and its
close tracking of GDP. Section 3 develops a simple model of precaution-
ary saving behaviour that is consistent with this view.
3 A simple model of precautionary saving behaviour
We consider the behaviour of a perfectly competitive, open economy
facing the world gross interest rate R  1.6 Firms produce the unique
output good thanks to the constant-return to scale technology
Yt ¼ FðKt,NtÞ ¼ Nt fðktÞ, where F is a neoclassical production function
and kt ¼ Kt/Nt. Capital depreciates at rate . The optimal demand for
inputs under perfect competition and constant returns to scale implies that
kt is time-invariant and equal to
k ¼ f 01 R 1þ ð Þ: ð1Þ
Since the capital/labour ratio is constant, so is the equilibrium real wage
w, which is
w ¼ f kð Þ  kf 0 kð Þ: ð2Þ
Our assumption that the interest rate (and hence the wage rate) is con-
stant is clearly unrealistic. However, it greatly simplify the analysis, and is
hopefully relatively innocuous provided that unemployment risk, rather
than changes in the interest rate, is the primary driver of the precautionary
motive.
Total population is normalized to one. Every household is endowed
with one unit of labour, which is supplied inelastically to firms provided
that the household is employed; the labour income of the employed is thus
w. From the second period of unemployment onwards, households
become ‘home producers’ and earn the fixed income  2 0,wð Þ. In every
6 Our open-economy specification implies that the clearing of goods and asset markets
operates through international lending or borrowing. The implied market-clearing con-
ditions are detailed in Appendix B.
period, employed household have a (time-varying) probability t 2 0,1ð Þ
of staying employed in the next period, and unemployed households have
a (constant) probability  2 0,1ð Þ of staying unemployed in the next
period. While it would be straightforward to introduce time-variations
in the job-finding rate 1 (with little changes in our results), we focus
on changes in 1t here, which we interpret as the involuntary layoffs rate
and which, as shown above, has undergone large and persistent variations
since the beginning of the current crisis. Note that while we take these
transitions as exogenous and ad hoc, they are obviously not so in the real
world. These probabilities are, thus, best interpreted as reflecting unmo-
delled frictions in job creation and destruction as well as in the uncoor-
dinated process of search that takes place between workers and firms.
The crucial feature of our model is that agents have limited ability to
insure against unemployment risk. For simplicity, we make the extreme
assumption that unemployment insurance, either private or public, is in-
feasible. Here again, the qualitative properties of the model would be
similar if we assumed that some (but imperfect) insurance was available.
Second, we assume that unemployed agents cannot borrow against future
income. The joint assumption of market incompleteness and borrowing
constraints implies that agents falling into unemployment cannot limit
their current income fall by collecting insurance payments or finance cur-
rent consumption against their (expectedly higher) future income. This
creates a precautionary saving motive for the employed whose intensity
depends on the extent of unemployment risk.
The budget constraint of household i is
cit þ ait ¼ yit þ ait1R,
where cit denotes consumption, a
i
t asset holdings, and y
i
t current income,
with yit ¼ w if the household is employed, yit ¼ 0 if the household has just
fallen into unemployment, and yit ¼  otherwise. Household i is assumed
to maximize
Et
X1
t¼0
tu cit
 
, with u cð Þ ¼ gc
 ln cð Þ if c  c,
þ gc if c > c,

and   gc ln cð Þ  1ð Þ, c*>0,  2 0, 1ð Þ. The instant utility function u(.)
is parameterized by (c*, g). It is increasing and continuously differentiable
over 0,þ1ð Þ, strictly concave up c* and linear with slope g at and above
c*. The linearity of u(.) above c* is crucial for the construction of our
equilibrium with limited households heterogeneity, for it implies that
above a certain level of consumption all households share the same mar-
ginal utility and hence the same demand for assets. The concavity of u(c)
below c* is also essential because employed households must dislike large
consumption falls if they are to form any precautionary saving in the first
place. Finally, we assume that  and R are jointly sufficiently low so that
R < 1 ð3Þ
Assumption (3) ensures that some agents may wish to borrow and hence
may face a binding borrowing constraint, and is necessary for the equilib-
rium that we study to exist. Note that condition (3) is robust to the intro-
duction of an endogenous interest rate. In particular, this inequality arises
naturally in general equilibrium when agents face incomplete markets and
borrowing constraints, because the precautionary demand for wealth
pushes the interest rate down relative to the complete market case (see
Huggett 1997, for a full discussion of this point in the context of the
neoclassical growth model).7
We focus on the simplest possible equilibrium generated by our model
given our assumptions about preferences and technology, and construct
this equilibrium via a simple ‘guess and verify’ method. More specifically,
our equilibrium has the property that all employed households end the
current period with the same level of precautionary wealth at, while all
unemployed households end the current period with zero wealth (conse-
quently, the wealth distribution has two states). The first part of the con-
jecture will be satisfied if all employed households reach a consumption
level above c*. The second part will also be satisfied if all unemployed
households face a binding borrowing constraint, and hence optimally
choose to liquidate their entire asset wealth instantaneously.
Since the type of a particular household depends on both its beginning-
and end-of-period wealth, it follows that under our conjecture households
can be of four different types only, depending on their employment status
in the current period (which determines their end-of-period wealth) and
that in the previous period (on which their wealth at the end of the pre-
vious period, and hence that at the beginning of the current period, de-
pends). We denote by ij, with i, j ¼ e, u, the type of a household, where i
and j refer to their employment statuses in the previous and the current
period, respectively, and where e and u stand for ‘employed’ and ‘un-
employed’, respectively (e.g. a eu ‘household’ is currently unemployed
but was employed in the previous period). In short, our conjecture
about the cross-sectional distribution of wealth, which will turn out to
7 Whether condition (3) is satisfied or not in general equilibrium ultimately depends on the
quantity of both inside (i.e. private debt) and outside (i.e. capital, public debt, money,
etc.) assets that agents may use for self-insurance against idiosyncratic shocks. A large
quantity of assets may allow them to achieve full insurance via asset accumulation, in
which case no agent faces a binding borrowing constraint and the complete markets
relation R ¼ 1 will prevail in the steady state. Otherwise, insurance will be imperfect
and R<1 (Woodford 1990 and Huggett 1993, 1997).
be true in equilibrium under appropriate parameter restrictions, drastical-
ly limits the length of individual history of unemployment shocks relevant
for the determination of the type of a household; this is in contrast with
much of the heterogenous agents literature, where the entire individual
history matters, and hence the economy is asymptotically populated by
infinitely many types of agents (e.g. Aiyagari 1994).
Under our joint conjecture, the budget constraints of the different
types of households are given by
ee : ceet þ at ¼ wþ at1R ð4Þ
ue : cuet þ at ¼ w ð5Þ
eu : ceut ¼ at1R ð6Þ
uu : cuut ¼  ð7Þ
This can be explained as follows. uu households, who were unemployed
in the previous period, ended that period with no wealth and thus enjoy
neither asset nor labour market income; however, they have turned into
home producers and thus get the income . eu households were employed
in the previous period and hence left it with wealth at1; in the current
period, they get no labour income but the asset income at1R, which is
entirely consumed (since these households do not replete their asset
wealth, by conjecture). ue households, who were unemployed in the pre-
vious period and hence start the current one with no wealth, must both
build-up their asset wealth, at, and consume, c
ue
t , out of their labour
income w. Finally, ee households ended the previous period with wealth
at1. In the current period, they get the asset income at1R, the labour
income w, and allocate this income to the repletion of assets, at, and the
consumption of goods, ceet . In equations (4–7), w,  and R are given and
constant; hence, once at is known, the consumption levels of the four types
of agents (the cijt s) can be determined as residuals.
The optimal asset holdings of employed households, at, can be inferred
directly from their (common) Euler equation. If they fall into unemploy-
ment in the next period, which occurs with probability 1t, they will
become eu households in the next period, so that their marginal utility
of consumption will be u 0 ceutþ1
  ¼ u 0 atRð Þ (see (6)). If they stay employed,
which occurs with complementary probability, they will be ee households,
and thus enjoy marginal utility u 0 ceet
 
, in the next period. A key condition
in the construction of our equilibrium (and one that will have to be
verified once the whole equilibrium is worked out) is that the consumption
of the employed is sufficiently high so that ceet ,c
ue
t >c
, while the
consumption of the unemployed is so low that ceut , c
uu
t <c
: In this case,
u 0 ceet
  ¼ u 0 cuet  ¼ g while u 0 atRð Þ ¼ gc=atR. Hence, the Euler equation
characterizing the optimal asset demand of both ue and ee households is
g ¼ R tgþ 1 tð Þ gc=atRð Þð Þ: ð8Þ
Note that there is no expectations operator in (8). This is because the
only source of uncertainty that households face when choosing their asset
holdings is about whether they will keep their job or not in the next period,
and that the probabilities associated with either event is known in the
current period. Solving (8) for at, we get the following expression for
the optimal asset demand of employed agents,
at ¼ c 1 t
1 Rt
 
: ð9Þ
This expression is the central equation of the model. Importantly, it says
that individual asset holdings, at, are increasing in 1t: a rise in the risk
of falling into unemployment causes households to raise precautionary
savings. This mechanism will provide an amplification mechanism for
the fall in aggregate consumption originally caused by a lower aggregate
labour endowment.
The description of the model is complete once we have characterized the
evolution of the shares of each agent type implied by the dynamics of t.
Calling !ijt the share of ij households at date t, simple flow accounting
indicates that these shares evolves as follows
!eet ¼ t1 !eet1 þ !uet1
 
, ð10Þ
!uet ¼ ð1 Þ !eut1 þ !uut1
 
, ð11Þ
!eut ¼ 1 t1ð Þ !eet1 þ !uet1
 
, ð12Þ
!uut ¼  !eut1 þ !uut1
 
: ð13Þ
We show in Appendix A that our conjectured four-agent type equilib-
rium exists for large (and plausible) parameter ranges. More specifically,
we check that under such values the steady-state counterpart of our model
(i.e. one in which t ¼ ) satisfies our conditions about the ranking of
consumption levels and the bindingness of the borrowing constraint for
unemployed agents. Then, if deviations of t from the steady state are of
sufficiently small magnitude, these conditions will also hold along the
stochastic model, and will thus be consistent with our conjectured
equilibrium.
Having derived the individual consumption and asset accumulation
rules, we may now turn to the aggregate dynamics of the model.
4 Dynamic effects of a shock to unemployment risk
Section 3 showed how the precautionary motive for holding wealth affects
the way households react to changes in unemployment risk. We now turn
to the aggregate implications of the precautionary motive, in particular
with respect to aggregate consumption, wealth and saving.
We take the path of t to be the exogenous forcing variable here. At any
date t, a share t of currently employed households will stay so in the next
period, while a share 1 of currently unemployed households, who are in
number 1Nt, will leave unemployment in the next period. Hence, the
dynamics of total employment is given by
Nt ¼ t1Nt1 þ 1 ð Þ 1Nt1ð Þ: ð14Þ
The most direct interpretation of unemployment risk as modelled here is
to think of Nt as the number of firms that are operative in the economy at
date t (or, equivalently, the number of divisions of the ‘representative
firm’), each of which being able to hire one household. Then, a shock to
t is one about the number of such firms that will remain operative in the
next period, while  is the rate at which potential firms restart being
operative.
All other variables of interest in the model depend on t and Nt. For
example, since only employed households hold assets, end-of-period
total assets are At¼ atNt, where at is given by (9). Similarly, from the
constant-returns-to-scale assumption, aggregate output is Yt ¼ f(k)Nt, so
the asset/output ratio is simply
At=Yt ¼ f kð Þ1at:
This ratio is countercyclical, due to the precautionary nature of the
demand for wealth: when t decreases (i.e. unemployment risk is
higher), individual wealth at rises while total employment Nt falls.
However, Yt is also scaled by Nt and hence the asset/output ratio exactly
tracks individual wealth.
What we are primarily concerned with here is the behaviour of aggregate
consumption, Ct, and the saving rate, St/Yt, induced by this precautionary
demand for wealth. Aggregating the budget constraints (4–7) under the
population sizes given by equations (10–13), we find that aggregate con-
sumption is
Ct ¼  At  RAt1ð Þ þ wNt þ !uut
 
, ð15Þ
where AtRAt1 is the change in total assets held by the households
and wNt þ !uut the total labour income. Finally, aggregate saving,
St¼YtCt, and the saving rate, St/Yt, can be computed directly from
(15) and the fact that Yt ¼ f(k)Nt.
Figure 2 displays the dynamics of the variables of interest following a
change in the path for the job-loss probability, 1t. More specifically,
we assume, clearly for illustrative rather than quantitative purpose, that
T1 ¼  (i.e. the job-loss rate is at its steady-state value at date T1),
T¼0.0025 (i.e. a shock of size 0.25% occurs at date T), while t
obeys the following AR(2) process from date t ¼ Tþ 1 onwards
t   ¼ 1:84 t1  ð Þ  0:86 t2  ð Þ
This path generates a hump-shaped pattern followed by a gradual (and
mildly oscillatory) mean-reversion of the job-loss rate, which peaks at
þ1%—as is roughly consistent with the evidence reported in Section 2.
The production function is assumed to be of the Cobb–Douglas form, i.e.
Yt ¼ Kt L1t , with ’ ¼ 1/3. We set the gross interest rate R to 1.01 and the
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Figure 2 Impulse-response functions. The panels display the level-deviations
from the steady states of all variables of interest following an exogenous
change in the path of unemployment risk, as represented in Figure 2a.
discount rate  to 0.97, so that R ¼ 0.9797<1 (as required by inequality
(3)). The threshold level of consumption c* and the slope of the instant
utility function at c* are both set to 1. Finally, the job-finding rate 1,
the mean job-loss probability 1, and the depreciation rate  are
assumed to be 0.5, 0.03, and 0.025, respectively. Given these parameters,
which satisfy conditions (A1–A3) in Appendix A, the dynamics of the
variables of interest directly follow from the path for t.
Employment, Nt, and (market) output, Yt, are given by equation (14)
and f(k)Nt, respectively. Individual assets, given by (9), reflect the precau-
tionary saving behaviour of employed (i.e. currently unconstrained)
households, and thus track the job-loss probability. In our model, only
employed households are unconstrained and hold assets; then, total assets,
At ¼ atNt, rise because individual assets change more than the number of
savers (i.e. the ‘intensive’ asset holding margin dominates the ‘extensive’
margin). This is in turn reflected in a persistently high saving rate.
The amplifying effect of precautionary savings on aggregate consump-
tion and its components is depicted in Figure 2g, h, and i. In Figure 2g, the
consumption response implied by our model is compared with that
implied by the complete-markets analogue (see Appendix C for details).
Essentially, in the complete-markets model unemployment risk is fully
diversified between individuals and hence no precautionary saving behav-
iour takes place; formally, the aggregate labour income wNt þ !uut is
given to the representative agent, who aligns current consumption to
total (i.e. financial and human) wealth. The partial equilibrium nature
of our model implies that complete-markets consumption follows a
random walk (as in Hall 1978), while the transitory nature of the shock
means that it moves by a relatively small amount (because the impact of
the shock on human wealth is limited). In short, the fall in aggregate
consumption that would be incurred by the representative agent is both
mild and acyclical. The situation is very different under incomplete mar-
kets; in this situation, the precautionary saving motive leading to the
gradual increase in total assets, At, is reflected in a large, gradual, and
persistent fall in aggregate consumption. Moreover, inasmuch as the
strength of the precautionary saving motive tracks unemployment risk
and that the latter is hump-shaped, aggregate consumption is
mean-reverting and U-shaped, as is consistent with the evidence shown
in Section 2.
Figure 2h and i look at disaggregated consumption levels to illustrate
that precautionary saving, rather than other factors, is indeed chiefly
responsible for the prolonged fall in current consumption. Indeed, one
legitimate concern one may have by looking at the path aggregate con-
sumption is that the latter could be driven by the consumption of
borrowing-constrained agents (i.e. those who do not form precautionary
savings), whose current income impacts their consumption level one for
one, rather than by that of unconstrained precautionary savers. Figure 2h
displays the total contributions of constrained and unconstrained house-
holds, and shows that much of the consumption dynamics is driven by the
behaviour of precautionary savers. In fact, the total consumption of con-
strained households rises mildly, rather than falls, after the shock. This
occurs for two reasons. First, constrained households rise in number after
the shock has taken place. Second, some of the constrained households
actually consume more than they would have had the shock not occurred:
those who liquidate their assets (i.e. ue households), whose precautionary
wealth has increased since the beginning of the crisis following rising un-
certainty about employment prospects. Figure 2i divides the total con-
sumption of precautionary savers (i.e. ue and ee households) by the
total number of such savers (i.e. !eet þ !uet ). This again establishes the
leading role of the precautionary motive in determining the dynamics of
aggregate consumption in the model.
Figure 3 carries out a sensitivity check with respect to the (exogenous)
job-finding rate , which is now set at 0.3 instead of 0.5. This focus on the
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Figure 3 Sensitivity. The panels are as in Figure 2. All parameters are at their
baseline value except for the job-finding rate, which is set at 0.3 (instead of 0.5).
job-finding rate is motivated by the empirical observation that such rates
vary substantially across OECD countries, while average job-loss rates do
not (see Hobjin and Sahin 2009). One implication of this finding is that
the higher unemployment rate experienced many European countries rela-
tive to the US is primarily due to fewer transitions out of the unemploy-
ment pool in Europe than in the USA; we thus wish to investigate what a
smaller job-finding rate implies for the transmission of labour reallocation
shocks. The figure show that shocks to the job-loss rate have stronger and
more persistent effects on aggregate consumption when the job-finding
rate is smaller. This is due to two competing effects. On the one hand, a
smaller job-finding rate raises the share of constrained (i.e. unemployed)
agents in the economy and lowers that of unconstrained (i.e. employed)
precautionary savers; this goes towards lowering the reaction of aggregate
consumption to the shock. On the other hand, for a given path of the
job-loss rate, a smaller job-finding rate magnifies the employment re-
sponse to the shock (as a higher proportion of employed agents turn
out to lose their job), which reduces the aggregate endowment available
for consumption and saving—see the wtNt term in (15). This second effect
turns out to be dominant (at least under our choice of calibration for the
other parameters), leading to stronger and more persistent responses of
most aggregates.
5 Concluding remarks
This article has built on a now old, but not mainstream, tradition in
macroeconomic analysis that emphasizes the importance of uninsurable
income risk and borrowing constraints in determining aggregate out-
comes. Early work in this literature, including those of Bewley (1983),
Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Kehoe et al. (1991) and Imrohoroglu
(1992), focused on the precautionary demand for money under incomplete
income insurance. Aiyagari (1994) and Huggett (1997) extended early
models by analysing the effects of the precautionary motive when assets
are claims to the capital stock. The latest wave of articles including
Heathcote (2005) Krusell and Smith (1997, 1998), and Storesletten et al.
(2007) introduce aggregate shocks (together with idiosyncratic uncer-
tainty) into this framework, thereby contributing to the extension of this
approach to a variety of macroeconomic issues, including business cycles,
fiscal policy, and asset pricing. Heathcote et al. (2009) provide a survey of
these models, commonly referred to as ‘heterogeneous agents’ models.
The purpose of our current research, of which the model developed
in Sections 3 and 4 is a representative example, is to offer simple class
of models/equilibria that incorporate a variety of channels related to the
precautionary motive and the demand for ‘aggregate liquidity’. Indeed, it
seems to us that the scope of analysis of incomplete market models is often
limited by the computationally difficult exercise of approximating the dy-
namics of the equilibrium wealth distribution. In contrast, our model pro-
vides an illustration of what can be achieved by confining oneself to the
simplest deviation from the complete markets assumption; essentially, the
outcome is a model that can accommodate uninsured individual risk,
agents’ heterogeneity, and the precautionary motive for saving, while at
the same time taking the form of a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model, for which a variety of workable solution techniques are
available. Ultimately, which of a fully fledged computational model or a
limited-heterogeneity approach should be used depends on the question
under scrutiny. Clearly, our framework generates overly simplistic wealth
distributions, and is thus poorly suited to the matching and characterisa-
tion of their empirical analogues, which is the focus of many articles in the
incomplete-markets literature. However, our approach flexibly incorpor-
ates the precautionary motive for holding assets into dynamic equilibrium
and can thus be extended in several directions while maintaining tractabil-
ity, e.g. by considering endogenous interest rate adjustments (such as those
which would occur in a closed or a large open economy), more realistic
labour market frictions and adjustments, a larger number of liquidation
periods for the unemployed, etc.
Because incomplete-markets economies typically generate aggregate
inefficiencies, they leave ample room for welfare-improving policy inter-
ventions. For example, in the context of the model presented above, rising
idiosyncratic uncertainty leads to a much larger fall in total private
demand than is (first-best) efficient. This suggests that this model may
provide a rationale for aggregate demand management of the
‘Keynesian’ kind, inasmuch as it may indirectly provide labour income
insurance when direct insurance markets are missing.8 Here again, it seems
important to carry out theoretical and quantitative experiments using
models in which the transmission channels of the different policy options
are transparent.
More generally, it is our contention that generalizing the incorporation
of uninsurable risk into the various strands of economic analysis may
considerably improve our understanding of the macroeconomy, both
along the business cycle and in time of major crisis such as that we are
currently experiencing. To give substance to this view, let us think
loud about some potential applications of our framework for a moment.
8 For example, Challe and Ragot (2010) construct a model in which debt-financed expan-
sionary fiscal policy may, by altering the stock of aggregate liquidity, boost aggregate
consumption and welfare.
One typical example of behaviour akin to ‘precautionary saving’ or
‘aggregate liquidity hoarding’ is that adopted by financial intermediaries
in the early stages of the crisis, during which they hoarded base money or
liquid assets to avoid any form of credit risk.9 This behaviour is clearly
detrimental to the normal functioning of financial intermediation, and
may even trigger the collapse of some financial markets (e.g. the interbank
market). Take, as another example, the behaviour of firms facing uncer-
tainty about idiosyncratic factors such as productivity, demand, etc. In
this situation, high individual uncertainty leads to delayed investment in
order to avoid commitment to future production.
To summarize, our answer to the question ‘What’s wrong with modern
macroeconomics?’ is that the latter has (thus far) considerably underesti-
mated the extent and cyclicality of the individual uncertainty faced by
economic agents. One implication is that macroeconomics has largely
overlooked the role of precautionary savings in the business cycle and
the way it affects aggregate demand. While the current article has focused
on the effect of unemployment risk on aggregate consumption, the same
argument applies, mutatis mutandis, to other economic agents or institu-
tions such as firms and financial intermediaries.
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Appendix A
A.1 Existence conditions
This appendix works out the sufficient conditions for the equilibrium
analysed in the body of the paper to exist. We must check that our equili-
brium conditions are satisfied in the steady state, as characterized by the
deterministic counterparts of (4–7), (9), and (10–13). There are two sets of
conditions for the equilibrium to exist. First, the ranking of consumption
levels must be consistent with the conjectured ranking under which the
equilibrium was derived, i.e. cuu< ceu< c*< cue< cee. From (4) and (5),
it is necessarily the case that cue< cee. Using (9), the condition that
cue¼wa> c* gives
w > c 1þ  1 ð Þ
1 R
 
: ðA1Þ
From (6) and (9), we have that ceu< c* if and only if R < 1, which
holds by assumption (3). Finally, from (6) and (7) the condition that
cuu ¼  < ceu ¼ aR gives
c

>
1 R
R 1 ð Þ : ðA2Þ
Second, the borrowing constraint must be binding for eu and uu
households. Since cuu< ceu under condition (A2), while the probability
of leaving unemployment is the same for the two types, we only need to
check that it is binding for eu households, which is the case if and only if
u 0 ceuð Þ > R u 0 cuuð Þ þ 1 ð Þu 0 cueð Þð Þ:
With ceu ( ¼ aR) and cuu ( ¼ ) to the left of c* and cue to the right of
c*, this inequality becomes
aR2


þ 1 
c
 
< 1 ðA3Þ
The stochastic equilibrium constructed in the article exists whenever
conditions (A1–A3) are jointly satisfied and fluctuations around the
steady state are small. They are satisfied for any plausible parameter
configuration provided that g and c* are chosen appropriately.
Appendix B
B.1 National income accounting
Clearing of the capital markets operates through international capital
movements. End-of-period assets, At, serve to form the capital stock
at the beginning of the next period, Ktþ 1, as well as net foreign assets
at the beginning of the next period, Ftþ 1, so that At ¼ Ktþ 1þFtþ 1. Firms
maximization under constant returns to scale implies that market
output, Yt, is
Yt ¼ wNt þ R 1þ ð ÞKt,
while total domestic output, which incorporates home production, is
~Yt ¼ Yt þ !uut . Solving the market output equation for wNt, substituting
it into (15) and using the asset market clearing condition, we get the
accounting identity
Ct þ Ktþ1  1 ð ÞKtð Þ þ Ftþ1  RFtð Þ ¼ ~Yt,
where the expressions inside the first and second pairs of brackets are
savings invested domestically and savings invested abroad, respectively.
Since the latter are also equal to net exports, changes in net foreign assets
are net exports plus capital income from abroad, i.e.
Ftþ1 ¼ Xt Mtð Þ þ R 1ð ÞFt:
Appendix C
C.1 The representative agent economy
To construct the equivalent open-economy, representative agent economy,
we must first set this agent’s subjective discount factor, ra, to 1/R (other-
wise foreign borrowing or lending would be unlimited). We then endow
this agent with the aggregate labour income wNt þ !uut , and compute the
implied optimal consumption and saving plans given the forcing sequence
tf g1t¼0. We assume that t ¼  until some date T1. At t ¼ T, a unanti-
cipated shock occurs that sets t in motion; once the shock has occurred,
the path for t is perfectly anticipated. With 
ra ¼ 1/R, the Keynes–
Ramsey rule implies that Ctþ 1 ¼ Ct for all t  T. Iterating the period
budget constraint (15) forward, yields the following intertemporal
budget constraint (IBC)
X1
i¼0
Ctþi
Ri
 
¼
X1
i¼0
wNt þ !uut
Ri
 
þ RAt1:
Using the IBC and the optimality condition Ct þ 1 ¼ Ct 8t  T, we
find that
Ct ¼  Ht þ RAt1ð Þ,
where Ht ¼
P1
i¼0 wNt þ !uut
 
=Ri is the representative agent’s human
wealth, RAt1 his (begining-of-period) financial wealth and
 ¼ R 1ð Þ=R is the propensity to consume out of wealth. With the econ-
omy being in the steady state before t ¼ T, we have At1 ¼ At2, so that
the change in aggregate consumption triggered by the shock is simply the
shock to human wealth, i.e. Ct ¼ Ht. Then, using unindexed vari-
ables to denote steady-state values, we have
Ct ¼  Ht Hð Þ ¼ 
X1
i¼0
w
Ntþi N
Ri
 
þ  !
uu
t  !uu
Ri
  
:
